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Peter McCormick*

Judgment and Opportunity: Decision
Assignment on the McLachlin Court

The workload of the Supreme Court of Canada is shared among the Court's nine
members, but is this sharing equal with respect to the writing of judgments?
A simple count does not provide an answer because not all cases are equally
important. This paper develops an objective measure of case importance-the
Legal Complexity Index-and applies it to the cases decided by the McLachlin
Court. It demonstrates that judgment-delivery opportunities for significant cases
have not been shared equally, either overall or with respect to any of the major
subdivisions of the caseload. Some judges enjoy the spotlight, while others
are relegated to the margins. An assessment of the major correlates of this
inequality-gender, seniority, and the "Chief Justice factor". indicates that their
combined impact poses a significant challenge for the Court.

La charge de travail de la Cour supreme du Canada est partagde entre les neuf
membres de la Cour mais ce partage est-il egal pour ce qui est de la redaction
des arr~ts? Un simple d6compte ne donne pas la reponse, parce que tous les
dossiers n'ontpas la m~me importance. Lauteur 6labore une mesure objective de
I'importance des dossiers-'indice de la complexit6 juridique-et I'applique aux
affaires tranchees par la Cour presidde par la juge en chef McLachlin. II montre
que la r~daction des decisions pour les dossiers de grande importance n'a pas
6t6 partagee egalement, soit dans I'ensemble, soit pour ce qui est des grandes
subdivisions du volume de travail. Certains juges sont en vedette tandis que
d'autres sont relegu~s 6 I'arri~re-plan.Une evaluation des principaux corr6lats de
cette in~galit6--sexe, anciennet6 et le , facteur du juge en chef ,-rv~le que
leurs incidences combinees reprdsentent un grand defi pour la Cour
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Introduction
We refer to the chiefjustice of the Supreme Court as being the first among
equals but this familiar aphorism is built on two claims, both of which call
for closer examination: First, are the judges on the Supreme Court really
equals? And second, is the chief justice really first? How could we tell?
How could we measure Supreme Court performance in an objective way
to justify or refute any such claim? I propose to answer these questions
by first establishing a new empirical methodology for evaluating judicial
decisions, and then applying it to the question of who has the opportunity
to contribute how much to what.
What is it that the Court is supposed to do for us? For one thing, it is
supposed to be the final decision maker with respect to disputes that raise
difficult legal issues, and for another it is supposed to provide the reasons
that explain and justify those decisions in such a way as to send coherent
and convincing signals to lower courts and to potential litigants about
how future disputes (or at least certain aspects of those disputes) will be
handled. Some Supreme Court decisions accomplish these functions to a
very high degree, others less so. Some are major decisions which "take"they reset the frame within which the central issue and related matters are
handled for some time into the future (at the extreme upward end, we call
these "landmark" cases). Some have more limited impact, such that their
reasons may need to be revisited, sometimes immediately and sometimes
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later, to provide that clarity and that guidance. Still others deal with more
minor or more routine issues, casting smaller precedential shadows or no
such shadows at all. But there is still a strong sense in which we can say
that giving firm, well-explained, professionally grounded explanations for
the outcomes to legally difficult cases is what the Court is all about. It
is the criterion upon which we judge a particular Court (in the standard
usage, a particular chief justiceship) when we compare it with others;
and it is also the criterion on which we seek to evaluate the contributions
of individual judges. We praise judges for having written the powerful
judgments that contribute usefully to the development of law and the
clarity of the law going forward, we criticize judges for writing reasons
that do not contribute appropriately to the evolving jurisprudence, and we
tend to overlook judges who do not write very many reasons that show up
on the radar screen at all.'
This is perhaps somewhat reductionist-authoring judgments for
the Court is not the only thing that judges do, not the only way they
contribute. Judges within the majority block, whose signatures sustain
the majority reasons written by one of their colleagues, take part in
a collegial circulate-and-revise process that seeks to refine and perfect
that final written product. Judges who write or sign dissents and separate
concurrences also contribute to the evolution of the law. For one thing,
2
they oblige the majority to explain themselves more fully and rigorously,
and in this way contribute tojudgments that are more careful and complete.
For another, and more directly, these ideas (sometimes) remain active and
relevant because the modern Supreme Court draws upon minority reasons
3
considerably more often than one might expect.

On the lighter side, two prominent American academics engaged in a tongue-in-cheek debate
I.
in the pages of a major American law journal on this subject, namely David P Currie, "The Most
Insignificant Justice: APreliminary Inquiry" (1983) 50:2 U Chicago L Rev 466 and Frank H Easterbrook,
"The Most Insignificant Justice: Further Evidence" (1983) 50:2 U Chicago L Rev 481. The current
Chief Justice of the United States Supreme Court joined this conversation, in a speech to the Federalist
Society on 16 November 2007. YouTube: FORA.tv, "John Roberts on the Most Insignificant Justice
Ever" (9 January 2008), online: YouTube <www.youtube.com/watch?v= 13ze4fl5itU>. This is the flipside of what has been described as the "most entertaining useless exercise in the legal world," namely
ranking United States Supreme Court justices. See: Roy M Mersky & Gary R Hartman, "Rating the
Justices" (1992) 84:1 Law Libr J 113; George R Currie, "A Judicial All-Star Nine" [1964] Wis L Rev
3; Bernard Schwartz, "The Judicial Ten: America's Greatest Judges" (1979) 4:3 S III ULJ 405 and
James E Hambleton, "The All-Time, All-Star, All-Era Supreme Court" (1983) 69:4 ABA J 462. What
I an drawing on is the very basic point that this significance (or lack of it) is being evaluated in terms
of the contributions made by the various justices to the body of American law through their written
judgments.
2.
See, e.g., Antonin Scalia, "The Dissenting Opinion" (1994) 19:1 J Supreme Court History 33 at
41.
3.
See Peter McCormick, "Second Thoughts: Supreme Court Citation of Dissents and Separate
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By the same token, the chief justice in particular does more than
participate in the decision-making panels with her colleagues. Her duties
include presiding over the administration of the Supreme Court and the
other federal courts, sitting on a variety of bodies and committees (such as
the Canadian Judicial Council and the selection committee for the Order
of Canada), and presenting the public face of the Supreme Court-to some
extent and on some occasions, of the Canadian judiciary as a whole. We
should perhaps suggest as well that the chief justice is to some extent
expected to speak for the Court by delivering a disproportionate share of
the judgments on some significant share of its most salient and publicly
controversial cases-although this, too, is mere supposition until we find
some plausible empirical and objective method of testing this hypothesis.
But centring the judicial function on the writing of legally significant
judgments provides the focus that leads to a quantifiable method for
measuring the participation of the various judges in the judicial product
of the Court. It grounds my first premise: Supreme Court justices
contribute to the institution and to the law through the writing of reasons
for judgment. And it leads directly to a second premise: Supreme Court
justices contribute more to the extent that those reasons for judgment
embody the more important cases that come before the Court. The point
of this article is to move this second premise beyond the banal by creating
an empirical and objective indicator for legal importance, and using this
indicator to drive the assessment of individual judicial performance in a
systematic and rigorous way.
I propose to start with the question of how to evaluate individual
cases in terms of their legal importance; then I propose to deal with the
question of how these cases can be attached to individual judges in an
appropriate way, which is usually straightforward but sometimes mildly
problematic. Then I propose to disaggregate the judge-by-judge data to
look more closely at the major types of law into which the case load can
be divided-that is, to pursue specialization and expertise. Finally, I will
use this process to return to the basic questions with which I started: how
equal is the Court in the assignment of opportunities for significant judicial
contributions? And to what extent and with what sort of focus is the chief
justice "first"?
I. The court decides: Assigning the judgment
There is a general description of the way that the Supreme Court deals
with a case after oral argument and decides who will do the writing. That
Concurrences, 1949-1996" (2002) 81:2 Can Bar Rev 369.
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description was first presented by Justice Bertha Wilson;4 later accounts
in Greene,5 Songer, 6 and Macfarlane 7 have echoed the description with
sufficient consistency that Wilson J.'s account cannot be thought of as
being outdated. The basic elements are as follows:
After oral argument, the members of the panel meet in judicial
conference to arrive at a first understanding of how the appeal should
be decided and who should do the writing. The procedure is for each of
the judges in order (starting with the most junior 8) to briefly identify the
major issue or issues, whether the appeal should be allowed, and the basic
grounds on which that outcome will be justified. We should envisage, I
believe, something more than a staccato sentence or two, but something
much less than a graduate school seminar exchange. At the end of this
process, it is decided (the passive voice reflects the standard description)
which of the judges best reflects the spirit of the panel and should take
the responsibility of writing the (majority or unanimous) reasons for
judgment; minority voices may also have emerged during the discussion,
and those judges will decide whether they will write in response to those
reasons, although protocol is for them to wait to receive the draft judgment
before circulating their draft dissents or separate concurrences.' It is
usually the case that judges will volunteer to write the draft judgment;
if two or more judges wish to write, seniority directs the choice. Should
there be no volunteers, the chief justice will politely suggest which of the
judges might volunteer; should this also fail, the chief justice will assign
the responsibility.
This is a more collegial practice than the American, where the senior
justice on the panel (or the senior justice in the majority bloc on a divided
panel) has the power simply to assign the judgment; my wording implies
that the chief justice does not lose this assignment power for the majority
by taking a minority position, although none of the standard descriptions
of the Canadian practice makes this explicit.
4.
Bertha Wilson, "Decision-making in the Supreme Court" (1986) 36:3 UTLJ 227.
5.
Ian Greene et al, FinalAppeal: Decision-making in CanadianCourts ofAppeal (Toronto: James
Lorimer & Company, 1998).
6.
Donald R Songer et al, La, Ideology, and Collegiality:JudicialBehaviour in the Supreme Court
of Canada(Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2012); Donald R Songer, The Transformation
of the Supreme Court of Canada: An Empirical Examination(Toronto: University of Toronto Press,
2008).
7.
Emmett Macfarlane, Governingfrom the Bench: The Supreme Court of Canadaand the Judicial
Role (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2013).
8.
On the United States Supreme Court, the procedure is precisely the opposite, with the Chief
Justice speaking first and the most junior justice last.
9.
This is the reason why almost all minority reasons begin with the statement that "I have read the
reasons" of the initial judgment writer.
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I admit to being frustrated by this description. It presents several
different selection principles that are part of the process, but that may
or may not apply to any specific case. First, juniority matters: to speak
first is to be in a position to volunteer first, or to be the first to sketch
an outcome-plus-reasons strategy which successfully anticipates (or even
persuades) the positions of the other members of the panel. Politeness may
make more senior members at least a little bit more reluctant to claim
the prerogatives of seniority. Second, seniority matters: both because it
breaks the ties should more than one judge volunteer, and because it is
only later in the cycle that one can clearly see what the emerging majority
position is. (For the first speaker to volunteer to write the judgment risks
the embarrassment of discovering that their position promises to be a
solo dissent.) It is also possible for judges later in the cycle to behave
strategically, locating themselves within an emerging majority so that they
can claim the judgment. 0 Third, the chiefjustice matters: both because the
chiefjustice is by definition always the most senior, and because the chief
justice gets to ask for volunteers (and presumably can use the position of
chair to encourage or discourage volunteering as the panel works through
the cycle) or to assign in the absence of volunteers. None of the standard
descriptions suggests that this responsibility devolves on somebody else
should the chiefjustice herself not be in the majority.
What is not mentioned, although it is hard to imagine that it never
applies, is any concern about how to ensure that "spirit of the panel"
and "senior volunteer" are actually in harmony. To put it bluntly: does it
ever happen that somebody volunteers, but the chief justice (or the most
senior member of the panel) says "no?"" Nor is there any mention of
an ethic of fairness or of taking turns, any Canadian counterpart to the
general expectation of roughly equal division that now applies south of the
border12 -ifa junior justice has been waiting long enough for a judgment

10. Chief Justice Burger of the USSC Was infamous for deferring a statement of his position in the
"seniors speak first" conference practices of that court so that he could assign reasons to himself or to
an ally.
11. Even "mood of the Court" can be ambiguous if the panel divides, with either dissents or separate
concurrences, or both-assuming we can locate all the judges along a single continuum, is the "mood
of the Court" the centre of the majority block, the centre of the all-but-dissenters, or the centre of
the whole panel including dissenters? There is a voluminous American literature on the strategies of
judgment assignment that considers these questions at some length. See, e.g., Lewis A Kornhauser &
Lawrence G Sager, "The One and the Many: Adjudication in Collegial Courts" (1993) 8 1:1 Cal L Rev
1.
12. See Gerard Magliocca, "Supreme Court Opinion Days" (21 June 2012), Concurring Opinions
(blog), online: <concurringopinions.com/archivesl2012/06/supreme-court-hand-down-days.html>:
"I'm not sure when the [Supreme] Court started distributing its opinion assignments evenly... [but]
[t]here was evidently a sea change in the Court's customs in the middle of the 20th century."
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in a significant case, when does this offset a colleague's seniority, and who
orchestrates this? (And, of course, what is "long enough"?) The more we
assume that judgments matter to the judges, that all of them want to write
some reasonable share of the decisions that are important to them, the
more important these things become.
But even if one accepts the standard description at absolute face
value, the question remains: how does it work out in practice? If there is
some informal or unofficial collegial balancing and accommodation that
overcomes the apparent opportunities for senior members to dominate the
judgment assignments, how effective are these in practice? This article
attempts to track down some of these implications.
II. Assessing case importance: Toward a methodology
Simply counting the cases in which each judge writes (or shares the writing
of) the judgment is too crude a measure to be convincing, because of the
enormous diversity of the cases that flow through the Supreme Court case
load. The McLachlin Court has handled just over 70 cases per year-sixty
per year if we consider only reserved judgments, as I believe we shouldbut it is constantly sending us signals that some of these cases are more
important than others. Some are reserved for judgment, others are not;
some are assigned to five-judge panels, others to seven-judge or nine-judge
full court panels; some are resolved in half a dozen pages of text, others in
more than a hundred; some are reserved for many months, some for a few
days, some not at all; some divide the Court, others are unanimous; some
are frequently cited, others not at all, and so on. We can only usefully count
things if that counting is accompanied by an appropriate weighting of each
of the things that is counted-that is to say, a weighting that reflects the
relative importance of specific cases.
The criterion of importance that I propose to work from is. legal
difficulty-cases merit our attention and deserve heavier weighting to the
extent that they deal with difficult legal matters. There are (at least) three
different ways in which a case might be considered to be legally difficult.
First, the case might deal with an issue of considerable complexity,
such that it resists a complete and final resolution and yet calls for
continuing efforts to optimize the various factors that must be balanced
and the various elements that must be appropriately incorporated. Perhaps
the best examples would be the two perennial subjects of Supreme Court
decision making-statutory interpretation, and standards of review. Every
few years, a major case will arise that attempts (once again) to set the tone
and direction for how this matter will be handled by the Supreme Court and
how it should be handled by lower courts. Frequently, these are contested
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decisions that divide the panel, generate lengthy reasons, and command
high citation counts-only for the matter to be revisited a few years later,
with a new attempt at conclusive resolution. The McLachlin Court made
its own contributions to these ongoing and apparently Sisyphean efforts,
with Bell ExpressVu LP v. Rex 3 for the former and Housen v. Nikolaisen4
for the latter.
Second, the case might deal with an issue against the background of
ambiguity or uncertainty in the law. Some of that uncertainty may be the
product of the Court's own decisions-for example, Law v. Canada5 in
1999 led off by admitting that the Court's jurisprudence on equality rights
had become somewhat confused because there were two or three quite
distinct tendencies, each supported by different sets of the judges and each
prevailing in certain types of cases, that had tended to pull the case law on
this matter in several different directions. Law was the attempt to resolve
these confusions in a single super-test, an attempt that seems in the end not
to have been completely successful (as witness R. v. Kapp 6 and Withler
v. Canada (Attorney General) 7 ), but that was in the interim one of the
Supreme Court's most frequently cited cases.
Third, a case might involve unusual novel issues. More often than
one might expect, Supreme Court judgments start off saying that this
is a question, or issue that has never come before the Court before. By
definition this means that there is no completely clear precedential path for
the Court to call on, no obvious answer that is easily called into service.
Obviously, the Supreme Court has spent the last 30 years grappling with
the most monumental insertion of legal novelty imaginable, in the form of
the entrenchment of the CanadianCharterofRights and Freedoms.Thirty
years is long enough for many of the nooks and crannies to have had
precedential light shone into them, although unexplored comers remain.
The McLachlin Court has spent a good part of the last decade struggling
with the best way to deal with two of these comers, namely freedom of
religion and freedom of association, with rather mixed and somewhat
inconclusive results-which is perhaps just a way of saying that novelty,
if not promptly resolved with decisive finality, devolves into ambiguity.
I will not consider a fourth element that might make a case difficultnamely, political salience-because for present purposes I want to treat
the Court primarily as a legal institution that exists to resolve legal issues
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.

Bell ExpressVu LP v Rex, 2002 SCC 42, [2002] 2 SCR 559.
Housen v Nikolaisen, 2002 SCC 33, [2002] 2 SCR 235.
Lav v Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [ 1999] 1 SCR 497 [Lcav].
R v Kapp, 2008 SCC 41, [2008] 2 SCR 483.
Withler v Canada (AG), 2011 SCC 12, [2011] 1 SCR 396.
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in ways that satisfy legal professionals. In saying this, I do not to attempt
to revive an earlier age of legal formalism, with its assumption of a
clear demarcation and separation between the world of politics and the
world of law. Rather, I recognize that even when politics contributes to
the issues before the Court, when the ideology or attitudes of individual
judges are thought to have intruded upon their resolution of a case, they
do so not by hijacking the process completely but rather by colouring or
complicating the legal material and legal processes that must be pursued
to a conclusion-which is to say that they penetrate more deeply in this
process to the extent that the law is difficult, rendered so by complexity,
ambiguity, or novelty.
Any reader of this paper could come up with their own exemplars
of the Court's more legally difficult cases and their own evaluation of
how satisfactorily the Court had resolved them. The content of those lists
would of course vary according to the interests, experience, and expertise
of the persons creating them. What I propose to do is to penetrate the
Supreme Court Reports to identify several objective factors, each of
which attaches with some reasonable probability to the difficulty of the
legal issues pursued in the case, and then to generate a "legal complexity
index" which reflects the presence or absence of these factors. Considered
singly, each of these indicators may well be less than perfect. But I hope
to persuade the reader that assembling ten of them into an index that
generates legal difficulty scores ranging between 0 and 15 will make the
whole more robust and convincing than any one of its several parts. This
index will generate scores for individual cases that can then be aggregated
to assess whether the opportunity to contribute significantly to the law
through the authorship of reasons on legally significant cases has been
distributed among the justices, both overall and with respect to different
major types of law.
III. The pedigree of a complexity index
My immediate enquiry was triggered by the methodology of Corley,
Steigerwalt and Ward's recent book, The Puzzle of Unanimity: Consensus
8
on the UnitedStates Supreme Court."
The major point under investigation
was finding a way to separate attitudinal/ideological elements from
(more) purely legal elements as drivers of United States Supreme Court
decisions. 9 The dependent variable was therefore the "puzzle" of the
18. Pamela C Corley, Amy Steigerwalt & Artemus Ward, The Puzzle of Unanimity: Consensus on
the United States Supreme Court (Stanford: Stanford Law Books, 2013) [Corley, Steigerwalt & Ward,
Puzzle].
19. The shift from a primary reliance on attitudinallideological analysis to "bringing the law back
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significant number of completely unanimous 2 judgments even on a USSC
as ideologically divided as that court currently is; the independent variable
was an index developed by teasing out five factors that would (as the case
worked its way from trial up to the Supreme Court) strongly suggest a case
that lacked any significant element of legal complexity or ambiguity. 2' The
present study borrows this basic idea-an index grounded in a number
of objective attributes of the "universe" of Supreme Court cases over a
specific period of time-but involves a number of significant revisions.
First, obviously, I want to look not at the USSC but at the significantly
different context and operation of the Supreme Court of Canada, with a
corresponding shift in the factors to be included in the index. (For example:
Corley, Steigerwalt and Ward do, and I will not, attach importance to
whether disagreements in the court appealed from coincided with which
political party appointed which judges.)
Second, I will turn the method on its head by using it to measure
not legal simplicity but rather its polar opposite, legal complexity-that
is, where Corley, Steigerwalt and Ward are focusing on those cases that
earned low numbers on their complexity scale, I am more interested in
identifying the cases with higher numbers, and how these cases have
been assigned to the various members of the Court. Third, because I am
not concerned with predicting Supreme Court behavior, but simply with
identifying the most important cases, my index will draw on a number of
aspects of the Supreme Court's own treatment of the case to assist with
this classification.
What I take from Corley, Steigerwalt & Ward's Puzzle, what I think of
as a very powerful idea indeed, is this notion of an index that focuses on
the more purely legal dimensions and aspects of a case-not its political
salience, not its headline-drawing power, not even the punchiness of
in" by finding the circumstances under which more purely legal and logical factors drive results seems
to be something of an emerging trend in the American literature on judicial decision-making. See
also Michael A Bailey & Forrest Maltzman, The Constrained Court: Law,Politics, and the Decisions
Justices Make (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2011).
20. That is to say, unanimous as to both outcome and reasons, excluding cases with separate
concurrences.
21. This seems to be a strange argument-if there is no real legal complexity or ambiguity, if it is
in purely legal terms truly an "easy case," then why would one go to the time, bother and expense of
taking it all the way to the highest court in the land to receive the obvious answer? Surely the most
compelling question when one contemplates such an appellate route is-what are my chances? But
a narrowly confined rational choice model is not necessarily the best way to study the very complex
decision of whether or not to appeal, and the simple fact is that a good proportion of the case load of
apex courts does involve cases that are not particularly complex. At any rate the "0" on my scale does
not necessarily mean "no legal difficulty at all," but "at the very bottom of the scale of difficulty in
comparison with the other cases in the caseload"-and the bottom of that scale may be well above
anything that can be regarded as "zero" in any absolute sense.
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the rhetoric that the judges may have exchanged in the process, but the
ambiguity, complexity, and novelty of the legal questions that need to be
tackled in the case, and the behaviour that this difficulty elicits from the
lower courts and the Supreme Court itself-and turning this focus into a
completely objective measure that ranks cases along a continuum.
The critical point is that this index does not reflect whether I as a
single observer think the case is legally important or difficult, but whether
the appeal courts and the Supreme Court itself have treated it in a way that
would suggest the case is important or difficult.
1. Framinga Canadiancomplexity index

The following are the variables that I will use to assemble my legal
difficulty index:
1. The success or failure of the appeal from the trial decision in the
22
court of appeal .
2. The unanimity or division of the court of appeal in reaching that
23

result.

3. The presence or absence of interveners at the Supreme Court
level. 24

4. The size of the panel to which the Supreme Court assigned the
25
case.
5. Whether the case was reserved for judgment, and if so for how
long.

6.
7.

26

27
Whether the Supreme Court allowed or dismissed the appeal.
The unanimity or division of the Supreme Court panel in reaching

that result.

22. The coding is: appeal dismissed = 0; appeal allowed = 1.
23. The coding is: unanimous panel = 0; divided panel = 1.
24. The coding is: no interveners = 0; one or more interveners = 1.
25. Assignment of an appeal to a full-court nine-judge panel is a clear indication of the Court's
assessment of the issue; assignment to the minimum five-judge panel is a clear indication of the Court's
perception of the issue as more minor and routine. The seven-judge panel is a slightly ambivalent
message, as it sometimes says "neither unusually important nor particularly routine" and sometimes
"a nine judge panel was not available and seven was the largest possible." The coding here is: 5-judge
panel = 0; 7-judge panel = 1; 9-judge panel = 2. There are a small number of eight-judge panels-eight
by initial assignment not eight by attrition from what was originally a nine-judge panel-and these are
also scored as 2.
26. The average time between a decision being reserved and the judgment being delivered is 6.5
months (197 days). One third of all cases involve deliberation time of less than 4 months; one half
take between 4 months and 9 months; one sixth take longer than 9 months. The coding is: less than 4
months = 0; 4 to 9 months = 1; more than 9 months = 2.
27. The coding is: appeal dismissed = 0; appeal allowed or allowed in part = 1.
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The length of the reasons that were necessary to explain orjustify
28
the result.
9. The presence or absence of indicators that the judgment was not
delivered as assigned at the post-hearing conference.
10. How often the case has since been cited by the Supreme Court in
subsequent reasons.
8.

To be sure, none of these is a perfect indicator, but each one of
them is such that it is reasonable to suggest that they are usually related
to the question of whether or not a particular case raises issues of some
significant degree of legal difficulty (ambiguity, complexity, novelty). For
each of them we can say that they suggest there is something here that is
more likely to be displayed by a legally difficult case than by a case that
is not legally difficult, or that is less legally difficult. If the appeal court
agrees with the trial court, if all the judges on the appeal court agree, if the
Supreme Court unanimously agrees with both those sets of judges-each
of these suggest a relatively routine rather than a legally challenging case.
And if that is true of each one of these variables considered separately,
then it must be even more true of the whole set of variables assembled as
an index. A high index score corresponds to a higher likelihood that the
case raises unusually challenging legal issues and has been treated as such
as it moved through the judicial hierarchy to and through the Supreme
Court.
Most of these elements are sufficiently straightforward as to require
no further explanation-a divided panel, a reversal of a lower court
decision,29 the presence of interveners, or the assignment of the case to a
nine-judge panel are all clear indicators of a case that is more difficult, less
straightforward, and more amenable to a variety of different approaches
reaching toward somewhat different or even dramatically different
results and reasons. Others among these elements may not be quite so
straightforward, and I will address three of these.

28. The word-count includes both judgment and minority reasons, on the grounds that this is the
count that indicates the Court's response (as distinct from the majority writer's response) to the issues
raised in the case. The average length is about 8,000 words; the markers of 5,000 words and 10,000
words divide the case load into roughly equal thirds. The coding is: reasons less than 5,000 words = 0;
between 5,000 and 10,000 = 1; over 10,000 =2.
29. Hettinger, Lindquist and Martinek have suggested that we should think of such reversals as
indications of "vertical dissent'--just as "horizontal dissent" involves disagreement between the
judges within a particular panel, "horizontal dissent" shows disagreement between judges at different
levels of court. Both signal (and the absence of both denies) a legal uncertainty that invites differing
but credible and defensible approaches to its resolution: see Virginia A Hettinger, Stefanie A Lindquist
& Wendy L Martinek, Judging on a Collegial Court: Influences on Federal Appellate Decision
Making (Charlottesville, VA: University of Virginia Press, 2006).
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First, there is the notion of "swing" judgments. Within a divided
panel, the development of written views through a circulate-and-revise
process may result in some judges changing their mind as to the most
appropriate result and reasons. Sometimes enough judges will be swayed
that the initially assigned majority judgment becomes a dissent or separate
concurrence, and an initial set of minority reasons becomes the judgment.
The Court's protocol stipulating that the initially assigned judgment
should always be the first one circulated, to which minority reasons
directly respond, provides a reliable marker as to when such a "swing"
has occurred, because this is the only way that the reasons designated as
"the judgment" can open with the comment "I have read the reasons of
Justice X, and with respect, [ cannot agree."3 Something of the sort does
not happen particularly often, but neither is it unheard of-on my own
count, the McLachlin Court has given us 85 examples, about six per year.3'
A case where the issues are such that judges shift their position as those
issues are argued out in detail through the circulation of draft reasons, and
where that shifting occurs to such an extent that it alters the panel's choice
as to which line of argument best deserves endorsement as the judgment,
strongly suggests a legally difficult case.
Second, it is on the face of it plausible to suggest that any decision
that resolves a difficult legal issue of some importance will be cited in
subsequent decisions of the Court, but there is a problem in reaching
the appropriate count for the current Court-some decisions have had
more than a decade to accumulate citations, while others have had only
months, which really means that the age factor will overwhelm any other
considerations. My solution is to do a citation count as of 31 December
2013, then divide it by the age of the cited case as of that same date,
generating a citations-per-year count with a very blunt coding: never cited
is "0," cited less often than once per year is "l," and cited more than
once per year is "2." Since the relationship between citation frequency
and age (for our Supreme Court as for appeal courts generally) is not a
straight line but a remarkably consistent decay curve,32 this somewhat
disadvantages not the newer cases but the older ones, although given the

30. For a perfect example, see R v Sinclair, 2011 SCC 40 at para 43, [2011] 3 SCR 3, where the
judgment of LeBel J starts with precisely these words: "1 have had the benefit of reading the reasons
of my colleague Fish J. With respect, I cannot agree with him."
31. For a more complete explanation of "swing" judgments, see Peter J McCormick, "'Was It
Something I Said?': Losing the Majority on the Modem Supreme Court of Canada, 1984-2011"
(2012) 50:1 Osgoode Hall LJ 93.
32. See Peter McCormick, "What Supreme Court Cases Does the Supreme Court Cite? Follow-Up
Citations on the Supreme Court of Canada, 1989-1993" (1996) 7 SCLR (2d) 45 1.

284

The Dalhousie Law Journal

relatively short time period and the bluntness of the coding, this is not a
significant problem.
Third, panels can divide themselves around one or more sets of reasons
in several ways. A unanimous judgment is, on the face of it, the one that
is most consistent with a lower level of legal difficulty, and it is scored as
"0." A majority judgment with minority reasons suggests a greater degree
of legal difficulty, dividing the Court on matters important enough to the
members of the Court that they publicly disagree, and it is scored as "1.33
Sometimes the disagreement within the panel is more extensive; these
would include plurality judgments (where no set of outcome-plus-reasons
draws the support of a majority of the members of the panel), or equal
division outcomes 34 (where the appeal fails but neither set of reasons can
be taken as firm precedent), or "no judgment" cases35 (where the divisions
between the fragments on the panel are such that the Supreme Court
Reports cannot designate any one of them as a judgment of the court).
All these outcomes can reasonably be taken as signalling a higher degree
of legal difficulty, and they are therefore scored as "2." One might argue
that this scoring is flawed because it fails to reflect the possibility that
for particularly important cases (such as major constitutional cases) the
Court will work particularly hard to achieve a unanimous result, such that
a score of "0" is not necessarily the most appropriate marker. I will take
the "By the Court" (unanimous and anonymous, in the sense of lacking
a designated lead author) judgment style as sending this signal, and this
"36
relatively small group of cases will also be scored as "2.
The range in values on the index runs from a low score of zero to a
high score of fifteen. It might be expected that there would be a fairly large
cluster of cases at the bottom end of the scale, representing the decisions
that are rendered orally and unanimously from the bench on the same day
as oral argument. This is less the case than one might expect-there are
only six "0" scores, and only 30 scores of "I," from the 1000+ decisions
that have been delivered to date by the McLachlin Court, and not all of
these were from-the-bench judgments.3 7 I will nonetheless exclude the

33. Obviously a narrow one-vote decision is a better indication of complexity than a solo dissent, but
it is important to keep the individual elements of the index as straightforward blunt measures.
34. For example, R v LFW, 2000 SCC 6, [2000] 1 SCR 132.
35. For-example, R v Brooks, 2000 SCC 1I, [2000] 1 SCR 237.
36. The "By the Court" device is, to put it mildly, an under-explored phenomenon-to the best of
my knowledge, there is no literature at all dealing with it. For a preliminary attempt to understand
its emergence, see Peter McCormick & Marc Zanoni, "The First 'By the Court' Decisions: The
Emergence of a Practice of the Supreme Court of Canada" Man LJ [forthcoming].
37. Sometimes it is a little perplexing why a case winds up as a brief from-the-bench judgment.
Consider R v JZS, 2010 SCC 1, [2010] 1 SCR 3. In that case, leave to appeal was granted from a
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from-the-bench judgments on the grounds that there is very little, if any,
contribution to the law contained in the very brief and often formulaic
("for the reasons given in the court below") reasons that accompany them.
2. The complexity index: Cases
One use of the index might have been to suggest that the entire case load
could be divided into two sets-the legally difficult on one hand, the
legally straightforward on the other-such that the index serves to direct
this division, leaving only the difficulty of where to draw the line between
them. This might be the most reasonable procedure if the distribution
was bipolar, or "u-shaped"-but, as I will demonstrate below, this is not
the case. I propose instead to treat the index as measuring the relative
complexity of each case, such that each case carries its complexity score
through the rest of this analysis. Rather than just saying that a "10" is more
likely to be a legally complex case than, say, a "5," 1will push beyond such
a dichotomous solution-instead, I will treat these scores as locating each
case on a continuum from the most complex (15) to the least complex (0),
such that in some sense a "10" is twice as complex as a "5," and a "10" is
more complex than a "9."
Figure 1 distributes the 894 reserved judgments of the McLachlin
Court to date over the 0-15 legal difficulty scores. The count for each
score is further divided into five different broad categories of appeal:
Charter cases, constitutional cases, public law cases, private law cases,
and criminal law cases. The order of listing is the order of priority for
assigning individual cases to the appropriate category; a criminal case
raising a Charterissue is counted as a Charter case, and a public law case
involving constitutional issues such as the division of powers or aboriginal
rights is counted as a constitutional case. In all cases, the attribution to a
category is based on the headnotes in the Supreme CourtReports. The five
categories are highly unequal in size-there are more than four times as
many private law or criminal law cases as constitutional law cases-but
the division is adopted because it corresponds to useful distinctions within
the caseload, and potentially to degrees of specialization or expertise
within the Court.

judgment of the BCCA, on a Charterissue involving new statutory provisions that drew on minority
reasons from an earlier SCC decision. The case was assigned to a nine-judge panel with several
interveners-but the oral hearing was abruptly cut short with a single-sentence unanimous judgment.
For a discussion, see Benjy Radcliffe, "R v JZS: One Small Step for the Court, One Giant Leap for
Child Testimony" (21 January 2010), The Court(blog), online: <www.thecourt.ca>.

286 The Dalhousie Law Journal

1160
.....
....
....
...
...
.........
........
... ................... .... .......... ...
..........................................

14 0

140
120
100

.

.

.....................

........

...

C rim inal

80

E3Private
Eao

... ....
.............
60 .........

6 C onstitutional

I

40 -

OCharter
3

20
0
15

14

13

12

l

10
1

9

8

7

6

5

4

3

2

1

0

Figure1: Index Scores, by Type of Law, Reserved Judgments SCC 2000-2013

The distribution is roughly bell-shaped, the major exception being the
slight dip for a difficulty score of 6. There are very few cases at the two
extremes-none with a score of the maximum possible 15, only one with
14, only nine others with 13. At the other extreme, there are two with a
score of the minimum possible 0, 10 with a score of 1, and 14 with 2. The
average, median, and mode are all 7.
The scores for all the cases within each of the five categories can be
accumulated to generate an average case difficulty, and this is presented
in Table 1. The average difficulty of Charter cases and constitutional law
cases is somewhat above the overall average, that for the higher volume
of criminal law cases is somewhat below, and public and private law fall
in the middle. This seems entirely plausible. Again, the methodology on
these early applications is generating results that are consistent with the
findings that would have been suggested by common sense.
Type of Law

Number of Cases

Average Case Difficulty

Charter law

158

8.35

Constitutional law

59

8.08

Public law

182

6.87

Private law

243

6.70

Criminal law

252

6.37

All reserved judgments

894

7.02

Table 1: Cases and Case Difficulty, Reserved Judgments SCC 2000-2013

The index can also be used to suggest how the total "difficulty scores"
are distributed among the various areas of law from one year to the next,
and this is shown in the Figure. The general pattern stays much the same,
but there is a fair degree of variation-criminal law was way up in 2000
but down in 2002; Charter law and constitutional law combined for
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half of the total in 2010, triple their share in 2006; public law peaked
in 2004-2006; and private law was at its highest in 2006-2007. But this
is oscillation rather than a steadily building trend of any kind, and the
general description of the difficulty-score allocation among the areas of
law would be about 25% each for criminal and private law, 20% each for
public law and Charterlaw, and 10% for constitutional law.
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Figure 2: Proportion of Legal Complexity Scores, by Type of Law

If the first test of the index is that it generates a reasonable distribution
of the cases, and the second is that it ascribes average difficulty scores
among the major elements of the case load in a way that is consistent with
common sense, the third is whether it identifies credible cases at the top of
the list. For reasons of space, I will limit myself to the top ten: the single
case with a score of 14 and the nine with a score of 13. These are listed in
Table 2 (which is really a single case in first place, with a nine-way tie for
second).
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Case

Citation

Judgment by:

Type of law

R. v. Kang-Brown

2008 SCC 18

LeBel

Charter

R. v. Sharpe

2001 SCC 2

McLachlin

Charter

R. v. Sinclair

2011 SCC 40

LeBel

Criminal

R. v. Cinous

2002 SCC 29

McLachlin &
Bastarache

Criminal

R. v. Gomboc

2010 SCC 55

Deschamps

Charter

Little Sisters Books & Art v. Canada 2000 SCC 69

Binnie

Charter

Canadav. Khosa

2009 SCC 12

Binnie

Public

Council of Canadiansv. VIA Rail

2007 SCC 15

Abella

Public

Doucet-Boudreau v. Nova Scotia

2003 SCC 62

lacobucci &
Arbour

Charter

LeBel

Private

Syndicat de la fonction publique v. 2010 SCC 29
Quebec

Table 2: Cases with Highest Complexity Scores; McLachlin Court 2000-2013

Again, the cases that score high on the index are plausible candidates for
selection as the more important cases of the 14 years. Their scattering
across the areas of law is similarly plausible (five Chartercases, two public
law cases, two criminal law, and one private law); the absence of a nonCharter constitutional law case is at first glance curious, but explainable
by the fact that the category is so small, barely a third as large as the second
smallest category. Their scattering across the years of the chiefjusticeship
is also plausible-the ten top cases are from nine different calendar years.
These three fragmentary indications are something of a firstcheck validation of the methodology. Discovering that the distribution
of the actual cases over the range of possible scores approximates a
bell-shaped curve is reassuring, because this is how many variables
organize themselves-anything other than a bell-shaped curve would be
sufficiently curious in itself as to require explanation, perhaps even to raise
real concerns. Identifying the ten cases that earned the higher scores is
reassuring, because each one is a credible candidate for the attribution of
major decision status, involving an issue or issues that deserves careful
attention. And the average case difficulty for the various areas of law is
intuitively credible as well-Charterlaw and constitutional law involve
the highest levels of legal difficulty, while the high-volume criminal (nonCharter) set involves the lowest (even after from-the-bench cases are
omitted). A methodology should prove itself out on the easy and obvious
questions before it can be used for more challenging ones. It is to the more
challenging questions that I will now proceed.
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3. The complexity index: Judges
In the slightly reductionist statement ofjudicial purpose that I proposed at
the beginning, the function of the Supreme Court is to deliver judgments
that resolve difficult legal issues in a definitive way that ripples through
the system through citation and following. The function of judges on the
Supreme Court is to contribute to that goal through the writing of reasons
for judgment on behalf of the Court that accomplish this resolution. But
if each individual case that has been decided has a legal difficulty score, a
numerical value generated by the application of the index described above,
then each judge must also have a total legal difficulty score that is the total
of the values of all the cases for which he or she wrote the reasons for
judgment. Since the same total score could result from lots of little ones
or from a few big ones (and I am not prepared to tackle the philosophical
question of whether one of these is pre-emptively better), this number will
be accompanied by both the total number of reasons for judgment that the
particular judge delivered, and by the average score for those judgments.
This description is not quite correct, and does not take us all the way
to accurate figures, because the Supreme Court in recent years (on my
findings, only since 199538) has adopted a practice of fairly routinely
presenting co-authored, rather than single-authored, reasons for judgment.
Instead of "the judgment of the court was delivered by Justice X" we now
sometimes see "the judgment of the court was delivered by Justices X and
Y." Even if this happened rarely, we would still need to make sure that it
did not identify some distinctively different subset of the caseload-in
particular, we would want to make sure that it was not used primarily for
the major cases. Since these cases account for fully 10% of the reserved
judgment case load (89 examples out of a total of 894), the better course
is to incorporate it-all the more so because some judges (such as
McLachlin C.J., lacobucci and LeBel JJ.) are much more likely to join in a
co-authorship than some of their colleagues. Co-authored decisions seem
to be, on average, slightly more legally difficult than the single-authored
cases 39 ; note that two of the top ten cases in Table 1 were co-authored.
Simply to drop these cases from the analysis would therefore seriously
distort the results.
The process for this incorporation is as follows: I will assume that
every one of the 89 co-authored reasons forjudgment represents an exactly

38. See Peter J McCormick, "Sharing the Spotlight: Co-authored Reasons on the Modem Supreme
Court of Canada" (2011) 34:1 Dal U 165.
39. The average difficulty score of a single-authored judgment is 6.95; the average difficulty score
of a jointly-authored judgment is 7.66.
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equal partnership between the two judges who are identified. (The order
of names is always simple seniority, and therefore we cannot use it to
suggest a "major author/minor author" message.) It therefore follows that
the legal complexity score for each of those cases must be divided between
the two judges. What the table shows is then the combination of these
two figures-the total of the legal difficulty score for all the solo-authored
reasons for judgment, and the equal one-half share of the legal difficulty
score for all the co-authored reasons for judgment-for each of the judges
who have served on the McLachlin Court.
Judgments

Score

Average

McLachlin CJ

111.5

825

7.40

LeBel

102.5

729.5

7.12

Binnie

92

717.5

7.80

54

424

7.85

Abella

54.5

394

7.23

Rothstein

53.5

359

6.71

Deschamps

49.5

356

7.19

Charron

50.5

349

6.91

lacobucci

47

344.5

7.33

Fish

54

312

5.78

Major

51

287.5

5.64

By the Court

45

254

5.64

Arbour

35

261.5

7.47

Cromwell

30

204

6.80

20.5

163.5

7.98

Bastarache

Gonthier

14

95.5

6.82

12.5

80

6.40

Wagner

7

42.5

6.07

L'Heureux-Dub6

5

37

7.40

Moldaver
Karakatsanis

Table 3: Total legal complexity scores, SCC 2000-2013

To make it clear what this score is measuring, we are talking not
about achievement, but rather about opportunity. The index has identified
and measured the legal difficulty of the cases that make up the Supreme
Court case load. However, viewed from the other side, the measure of
the difficulty of the case is simultaneously a measure of the opportunity
it presents to the judge(s) who author the majority judgment-the extent
to which it represents a chance to deliver reasons for judgment that ripple
forward through the future decisions of the Supreme Court itself and

Judgment and Opportunity: Decision Assignment
on the McLachlin Court

291

lower Canadian courts. How effectively the opportunity is used is another
matter, and not part of this project. Undoubtedly, some judges in some
cases do a better job than other judges in other cases (or, for that matter,
the same judge in other cases). The challenge may be handled remarkably
well in a way that sets the standard for years to come, or it may be handled
minimally and competently, or it may be handled in a less than satisfactory
way such that the issue needs to be revisited. Achievement is the product
of opportunity and execution, and the current project attempts to measure
only the first part of this combination. The discussion that follows is
therefore not about which are the greatest judges on the Court or which
will have the most lasting impact on the law. It is simply exploring which
judges have had the greatest opportunity to make these contributions, in
which areas of law, and in which years.
I have said above that I think it is the function of the Court to
provide solid answers to difficult questions. I have suggested an index
that measures the legal difficulty of each individual case, and therefore
of every combination of cases, that come before the Court. I suggest that
assembling those individual cases on a judge-by-judge basis measures
the way the Court allocates and shares the opportunities for judgmentauthoring judges to contribute to the Court's central function.
The spread is considerable, with McLachlin C.J.'s 825 points
leading the way and LeBel and Binnie JJ. close behind with over 700
points, followed by a considerable drop to a second tier from which the
numbers continue to drop. Taking the scores more literally than perhaps
we should, these three judges have dealt with about one third of the total
legal complexity that has confronted the McLachlin Court, their fifteen
colleagues sharing the other two thirds; add in Bastarache and Abella
JJ. and these five judges are up to one half. But it is obvious from the
second column of Table 3 that the reason the three justices at the top of
the table have accumulated so many legal complexity points is because
they have delivered more judgments than the others, something that is not
unconnected to the fact that these are the three judges who have had more
years of service (see Table 6). This dimension will be explored below.
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Figure3: Number ofDecisions,by Justice and Complexity Score, McLachlin
Court 2000-2013

The first better measure of how equally the opportunity to make this
impact has been shared (or not) would be not their total score but the
average complexity score of the judgments that they did deliver, however
many those may have been. All judges will have a set of judgments to
write that is a mixture of high and low difficulty cases, and this is reflected
in Figure 3, above. The question is whether this set might be skewed
higher or lower than the overall average for different judges. Put crudely,
are there "workhorse judges" who write more of the lower complexity
reasons, to be distinguished from "star" judges who write fewer of the
more difficult-and presumably more important-cases. These numbers
vary much less, and when they do vary they create quite a different pattern,
splendidly indicated by the fact that McLachlin C.J. at the top of the total
complexity score table and L'Heureux-Dubd J. at the bottom both have
exactly the same case average complexity score of 7.40. The average case
complexity overall, as has been indicated above (see Table 1), is 7.02; ten
judges scored above this value, and nine below (including "the Court").
But only three judges scored above the average by a margin that exceeds
the standard deviation, those three being Gonthier, Bastarache and Binnie
JJ., in that order. Only three are more than a standard deviation below the
overall average, those three being Major J. (the lowest), Fish and Wagner
JJ. In the aggregate, these apparently minor differences add up; Bastarache
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and Abella JJ. delivered no more judgments for the Court than Fish and
Major JJ., but their total complexity scores place them much further up
the table.
There is one other very low figure for average complexity value, and
rather surprisingly that is the one for "By the Court" (anonymous and
unanimous) decisions. It has sometimes been suggested 40 that the "By the
Court" style is something the Court uses to make particularly important
decisions, usually bearing on constitutional issues, in a particularly
emphatic way, but this does not seem to be a useful generalization for
the McLachlin Court's use of the device. It is not that there have not
been examples of cases that fully fit Bzdera's characterization-Suresh
v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) and United States
v. Burns,4 for example, both earned a complexity score of 12-but
overall the complexity of "By the Court" judgments has been below the
all-decisions average. If we were to personify the practice as Mr. Justice
By the Court (to paraphrase Nygaard's adroit characterization 42), then he
would be tied for last place on the Court for average case complexity. This
strongly suggests that the standard Bzdera-style description of "By the
Court" judgments is catching only part of a larger story.
4. The complexity index: Types of law
The legal difficulty scores can also be broken down in the way suggested
in Figure 1, into the five major subsets of the Supreme Court case load,
to provide a more nuanced look at judgment assignment practices. For
present purposes, I suggested above that there were five relevant subsets
of the total case load:
* Charter law
* Constitutional law
* Public law
* Private law
* Criminal law
These five are of course equal in neither case count nor total complexity
score, a consideration that needs to be carried through to a discussion of
the disaggregation that follows. The proportions of both case count and
total complexity of these five subsets are:

40. See, e.g., Andrd Bzdera, "Comparative Analysis of Federal High Courts: A Political Theory of
Judicial Review" (1993) 26:1 Can J Political Science 3.
41. Suresh v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2002 SCC 1, [2002] 1 SCR 3;
United States v Burns, 2001 SCC 7, [2001] 1 SCR 283.
42. Richard Lowell Nygaard, "The Maligned Per Curiam: A Fresh Look at an Old Colleague"
(1994-1995) 5 Scribes J Leg Writing 41.
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Type of law

Number of cases

Charterlaw

158 (17.8%)

Constitutional law

Total Complexity Score
1320 (21.2%)

59 (6.6%)

477 (7.6%)

Public law

182(20.5%)

1250 (20.0%)

Private law

243 (27.3%)

1627 (26.1%)

Criminal law

247(27.8%)

1562 (25.0%)

Table 4: Case Count and Total Complexity Score, Reservedjudgments

With this as the background, Table 5 follows through by applying this
disaggregation to each of the fifteen justices who has served on the
McLachlin Court.
Charter

constitutional

McLachlin CJ

261.5

81.5

120

211

151

825

LeBel

131

54

177.5

244.5

122.5

729.5

Binnie

107.5

69.5

134.5

237

169

717.5

Bastarache

96

16

117

114

81

424

Abella

60

37.5

113.5

81.5

101.5

394

Rothstein

27.5

24

120

155.5

32

359

public

private

criminal

Total

Deschamps

89

17.5

32

150.5

67

356

Charron

96.5

0

25

22

205.5

349

lacobucci

73.5

35

81.5

90.5

64

344.5

Fish

54.5

0

38

17.5

202

312

Major

20

31

73

100.5

63

287.5

By the Court

81

47

52

33

41

254

Arbour

99.5

10

11

30

111

261.5

Cromwell

33

17

61.5

49.5

43

204

Gonthier

35.5

29

46

45

8

163.5

Moldaver

31

0

23

2.5

39

95.5

Karakatsanis

11

8

12.5

15

33.5

80

Wagner

0

0

5

18.5

19

42.5

L'Heureux-Dub6

12

0

7

9

9

37

Table 5: Total Complexity scores by type of law, Reserved Judgments
2000-2013

The table conveys three different pieces of information. First, the final
column, echoes Table 3 by providing a simple ranking of the justices in
terms of the complexity score totals for the judgments they authored and
co-authored; this has already been discussed. Second, the different "shape"
of the Court for the various subfields of law-a somewhat different set of
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judges stand out, and different judges rank lower, for the different major
types of law the Court deals with from one year to the next. Charter law is
the only sub-field with the same top three in the same order as the overall
totals, but Arbour J. from the bottom half of the table is fourth and Charron
J. is fifth. Charron and Fish JJ. are major players in criminal law, Rothstein
and Deschamps JJ. in private law; private law and constitutional law have
the same top three but in a different order. This hints at a specialization
factor-the "complexity mix" of the five subsets is significantly different
from one judge to another-but further refinement of the table is necessary
before we can pursue this effectively.
Third is the different shape of the complexity opportunities for each of
the judges. Charron J.'s Supreme Court contributions, for example, were
almost entirely in relation to criminal law and Charter law; she wrote
judgments for no constitutional law cases, and ranks near the bottom of the
Court for private law and public law. Fish J.'s involvement is if anything
even more heavily overbalanced in the criminal law area. Major J. is almost
the converse, contributing mostly to private law and public law, precisely
the areas on which Charron J. is the least visible, and the same can be
said of Rothstein J. McLachlin C.J. is considerably more balanced, but
her contributions have clearly been more heavily concentrated in Charter
cases than her colleagues.
IV. Assessing equality: Applying the methodology
The total complexity scores over the total length of their service does
not precisely indicate the extent to which opportunity has been equally
distributed among the judges for the obvious reason that the length of
service has been highly unequal. Two judges (McLachlin C.J. and LeBel
J.) have served for the entire 14 years; at the other extreme, four judges
(Wagner, Moldaver, Karakatsanis and L'Heureux-Dub6 JJ.) served for
barely two. To take this into proper consideration, Table 6 presents the
overall complexity score, and the complexity score for each of the types of
law, on a per-year-of-service basis 43; the overall average figure is included
for comparison purposes.

43. The average figures represent the "average of all judges" and excludes "By the Court"judgments.
The exclusion does not distort the figures because the score involved-254 points, over 14 years,
divided on each occasion by the seven to nine judges on the panel, and then divided among the judges
roughly proportionately to their years of service-is both modest and widely distributed.
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Judge
lacobucci
Binnie
McLachlin CJ
Arbour
LeBel
Bastarache
Charron
AVERAGE
Major
Gonthier
Rothstein
Moldaver
Abella
Cromwell
Karakatsanis
Deschamps
Wagner
Fish
By the Court
L'HeureuxDub6

Service
4.5 yrs
11.8
yrs
14.0
yrs
4.5 yrs
14.0
yrs
8.5 yrs
7.0 yrs
6.0 yrs
3.6 yrs
7.8 yrs
2.2 yrs
9.3 yrs
5.0 yrs
2.2 yrs
10.0
yrs
1.2 yrs
10.1
yrs
2.1 yrs

Charter
16.4
9.1

constitutional
7.8
5.9

public
18.2
11.4

private criminal
14.3
20.2
14.3
20.1

Total
76.9
60.9

18.7

5.8

8.6

15.1

10.8

59.0

22.2

2.2

2.5
12.7

6.7
17.5

24.8
8.9

58.4
52.2

11.3
13.8
10.0
3.4
10.0
3.5
14.1
6.4
6.6
5.0
8.9

1.9
0
3.5
5.2
8.1
3.1
0
4.0
3.4
3.6
1.7

13.8
3.6
9.7
12.2
12.9
15.3
10.5
12.2
12.2
5.7
3.2

13.4
3.1
12.9
16.8
12.6
19.8
1.1
8.7
9.9
6.8
15.0

9.6
29.4
12.3
10.6
2.2
4.1
17.8
10.9
8.6
15.3
6.7

50.0
49.9
48.5
48.2
45.9
45.8
43.5
42.2
40.6
36.4
35.6

0
5.4

0
0

4.0
3.8

14.9
1.7

15.4
20.1

34.3
31.0

5.8
11.2

3.4
0

3.7
6.6

2.4

2.9

18.2

8.4

8.4

17.9

Table 6: Average Complexity Score, by Justice and type of law; McLachlin
Court 2000-2013

This table is the top of the mountain that this article set out to climb. It is
the basis for deciding on an empirical basis whether the opportunities for
doctrinal contributions are allocated among the judges on the Court on a
basis approaching equality, allowing for the varying length of service of
those judges. If that allocation truly pursued equality, then the numbers
in the final column would not vary much. The considerable degree of
variation that actually prevails in that column indicates that the allocation
is not particularly equal and that some judges enjoy more opportunities for
enduring influence than others.
The five subset columns provide a window on a second aspect of
Supreme Court opportunity allocation, and that is the somewhat tricky
subject of specialization. It is obvious that the judges of the Supreme
Court bring a variety of background training and experience to the Court.
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From time to time, that is a factor in their selection, as (for example)
when commentators look at the fairly large proportion of criminal cases
in the case load, and worry whether a departing justice will be replaced by
someone with a strong background in that type of law. Yet-as a justice
of the Alberta Court of Appeal pointed out to me years ago-although it
would clearly be foolish not to draw on the special training, experience
and interests of particular judges, an appeal court has to be careful not to
walk too far down that particular path. For one thing, pursued too far, it
means that for a period of time the law in a particular area is dominated
by a single judge rather than by the more collegial and collective approach
that appeal courts are supposed to apply to such issues; for another, it can
create a significant continuity problem when the "expert" leaves the Court.
The five columns of Table 6 show that there is indeed a degree of
specialization-some judges whose overall per-year complexity figures
are not particularly high do nonetheless rank toward the top of the Court
for one or more of the various subsets, even on the rather general basis
that these five subsets provide. Arbour and Charron JJ. stand out for
criminal law, lacobucci, Binnie and Major JJ. for private law, Jacobucci
and Rothstein JJ. for public law, Arbour J. and McLachlin C.J. for Charter
law, and Gonthier and lacobucci JJ. for constitutional law. It would be a
mistake to overemphasize this degree of apparent specialization, because
it stops far short of a virtual monopoly or the exclusion of others, but it
would also be a mistake to leave it out of the assessment. That said, the rest
of this article will focus on the final column, the total per-year complexity
scores.
In these terms, Table 6 can be seen as dividing the judges into three
fairly clear categories. There is a top group of four judges (lacobucci,
Binnie J., McLachlin C.J. andArbour J., in that order) whose yearly average
complexity score is more than 10% greater than the all-judge average.
Toward the bottom of the table there is a set of seven judges (Abella,
Cromwell, Karakatsanis, Deschamps, Wagner, Fish and L'Heureux-Dub6
JJ.) whose yearly average complexity score is more than 10% below the
all-judge average; obviously, the years of service for Wagner, Karakatsanis
and L'Heureux-Dub6 JJ. are so low, and so concentrated at the lowexperience beginning (for Wagner and Karakatsanis JJ.) and the end-ofservice closing (L'Heureux-Dub6 J.) as not to be strictly comparable. The
remaining seven judges cluster within a "plus or minus 10% of average"
zone. The total years of service for each of these three sets-high,
medium and low per year complexity scores-is comparable at (roughly)
30%/40%/30% of the total, which makes it reasonable to use them as a
basis for comparison.
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Consider Binnie, Rothstein, and Fish JJ. as reasonable examples of
each of the three groups, with annual complexity totals of about 60, 45 and
30 respectively, their names giving the differences more bite than abstract
categories could. The fifteen-point spread in the by-year complexity scores
is both powerful and convenient, given that it corresponds to the highest
possible complexity score for a single case. Putting it a little differently,
there are fewer than a dozen cases per year with a complexity score of
ten or higher to be allocated among the judges. These scores suggest that
every year Binnie J. got at least one more of these than the average judge
(roughly, Rothstein J.) and Fish J. got at least one less. Over the eight-totwelve years served by these three exemplar judges, these differences add
up to something significant.
Let me unfold the impact of the allocation of complexity opportunity
in a different way. In any given year, each judge will write or co-write
a set of judgments that earn them an annual complexity score, and this
means that for each year we can rank the nine judges on the Court from
first through ninth on this complexity measure." Averaging the score
over a number of years may be misleading because of an unusually low
score for a single year, or it may lead us to overlook a stellar year that on
average vanishes behind a string of more mundane scores. A year-by-year
measure will better reflect such possible variations and fluctuations. Table
7 therefore presents this information in terms of how many times the judge
in question had the highest (or second highest, or third highest, and so on)
complexity score for any single year. The second last column indicates the
number of years over which this record has been accumulated, and the last
column indicates the average annual ranking for each judge; the ordering
is driven by the final column.

44. The turnover ofjudges on the Court is less problematic than one might expect, because they tend
to leave the Court toward the middle of the year and be appointed early in the fall. That is to say, in
the year of the turnover on one of the Court's nine seats, it is usually the case that the retiring judge
still participates in reserved judgments for several months, while the new judge is waiting for the first
reserved judgments on which they served to be delivered.
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Judge

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

Yrs

Avge

lacobucci

2

2

0

1

0

0

0

0

0

5

2.0

Binnie

2

5

0

2

2

1

0

0

0

12

3.0

McLachlin

3

3

3

1

1

1

1

1

0

14

3.4

Moldaver

1

0

0

0

0

0

1

0

0

2

4.0

Charron

2

1

0

1

1

0

1

1

0

7

4.0

LeBel

1

3

2

2

2

1

1

0

2

14

4.4

Bastarache

1

0

2

2

1

1

1

1

0

9

4.6

Rothstein

2

0

0

2

1

1

0

1

1

8

4.8

Arbour

0

0

3

0

0

0

1

1

0

5

4.8

Major

0

0

0

1

2

2

1

0

0

6

5.5

Abella

0

0

1

2

2

0

2

2

0

9

5.7

Cromwell

0

0

1

0

0

2

1

0

1

5

6.2

Deschamps

0

0

1

0

1

2

3

1

2

10

6.7

Karakatsanis

0

0

0

0

1

0

0

0

1

2

7.0

0

2

1

5

7.4

Gonthier
Fish

0

0

0

0

Wagner

0

0

L'1H-Dub

0

0

0

1

0
0

0

1

1

2

4

9

7.6

0

0

0

0

0

1

0

1

8.0

0

0

0

0

0

1

2

3

8.7

0

2

Table 7: Relative rankingsfor year-by-year complexity scores

This roughly tracks the average figures in the previous table-lacobucci,
Binnie JJ. and McLachlin C.J. top the table, Fish, Wagner and L'HeureuxDub6 JJ. figure toward the bottom. But this detail makes my point with
even greater emphasis. Some judges have placed in the "top third" of
the Court for year after year of their service-nine times in 14 years for
McLachlin C.J., seven times in 12 years for Binnie J., six times in 14 years
for LeBel J., four times in five years for lacobucci J.-while some other
judges definitely have not-Deschamps J., for example, did so only once
in ten years, Abella J. only once in nine, Major J. never in six. Conversely,
some judges frequently rank in the bottom third of the Court - Fish J. for
seven years out of nine, Deschamps J. for six years out of ten, Abella J.
for four years out of nine. The detail of this table reinforces the overall
message of the previous one, which is that these are persisting patterns.
The basic message answers the first of the questions that I posed at the
beginning: how equal is the allocation of opportunity among the judges on
the Court? And the answer is: not very.
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Charter

Constitutional

Public

Private

Criminal

Arbour

Gonthier

lacobucci

lacobucci

Charron

Iacobucci

lacobucci

Rothstein

Binnie

Arbour

McLachlin

Binnie

Bastarache

Rothstein

Fish

Moldaver

McLachlin

Gonthier

LeBel

Moldaver

Charron

Major

LeBel

McLachlin

Wagner

Table 8: Top five judges: per-year complexity score, by type of law

Ask the question in a different way: for each of the five subsets of
law identified, who were the top five judges on a "complexity score per
year" basis? This is shown in Table 8. lacobucci J. makes the table four
times, in four different areas of law, with two firsts and two seconds;
McLachlin C.J. is there three times, with a third and a fourth and a fifth.
Seven judges made the table twice, led by Arbour J. with a first and a
second. The expectation would therefore be that these names, modified by
the length of service factors, are the ones that figure most prominently in
any academic survey of the Supreme Court's development of the law in
these various areas.
It is one thing to "eyeball" the tables and say that the results do not
look very equal; but in fact equality in the distribution of opportunities is
something that can be measured precisely. Figure 4 is a first step toward
such a measurement. It graphs the distribution of complexity scores for the
calendar year 2005.4" The bottom (dashed) line is the individual complexity
score for each of the nine judges, from lowest to highest, which is to be
compared with the straight (solid) line which gives each of the nine the
identical average score. The two upper lines then present the cumulative
totals for the nine judges, the straight (dotted) line for the perfectly equal
shares, and the curved (solid, diamond-studded) line for the actual and
unequal numbers. The gap between the two top lines is the departure from
equality, which can be expressed as a single number that measures the area
under the curved line as a proportion of the area under the straight line.
For 2005, that number is .845. This is roughly the degree of inequality that
would exist if three judges had an average complexity total score, three
had a score one third higher, and three had a score one third lower: that
is, the scores of 60, 45 and 30, the Binnie/Rothstein/Fish ratios described
above.

46

45. This particular year was selected because the inequality index for this year is the closest to the
average index for all fourteen years of the McLachlin Court.
46. The actual inequality index score for this notional "three Binnie J., three Rothstein J., three Fish
J." court would be .867, a level of equality that the Court has exceeded only once in the last fourteen
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Figure4: Inequality Curve-actualand cumulative complexity scoresfor
calendar2005

The same calculation can be made for each year of the McLachlin
Chief Justiceship, and the results are shown in Figure 5. The equality in
the allocation of cases has been slightly and gradually increasing over
the decade, from scores hovering around .800 in the beginning to scores
approaching .900 at the end; the average over the entire fourteen years has
been .836. Figure 4 is therefore a fair reflection of the persisting level of
inequality in the allocation of cases, measured in terms of complexity.

Equality Index
0.6
0.4

0
2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007 2008

2009 2010

2011

2012

2013

Figure 5: Equality Index for Per-Judge Complexity Scores, Supreme
Court, 2000-2013

One way to look at the overall impact of this inequality is notionally
to create a nineteen-judge court (including Justice By the Court as the
nineteenth member), and then to populate it with the annual average
complexity scores-not total scores, because this so heavily reflects
differences in length of service. We can then calculate the equality curve
for this court, overall and for each of the five major types of law, and for a
years.
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close look we can recalculate the curve for each of the five major areas of
law. The results are shown in Figure 6.
1.2

,/"
0.8

,

- ••Charter
Constitutional

-

.

-

-*Public

0.6

Private
- - - - Criminal

0.4
0.2

.....
02--

.......

•.........
......................................
All Cases

..
.

Equality

Figure 6. Inequality Curve, all judges, by type of law
The first thing to notice is that the inequality curve for total cases
lies closer to equality than any of the curves for the five subsets, which
suggests a certain element of de facto specialization-if there was the
same amount of inequality tilted toward the same subset of judges across
all types of law, then the total curve line would be somewhere in the middle
of those lines, and therefore somewhat lower than is actually the case.
The defacto specialization of judges-that is, the fact that inequality tilts
toward different segments of the Court for different types of law-means
that the inequality in the allocation of opportunity is to some modest extent
offsetting. However, since that offset still leaves us with the inequality of
Figure 4, it might be more accurate to say that the allocation of opportunity
within each type of law is even more uneven than the allocation overall.
V. Correlates of inequality
It is one thing to identify persisting inequality in the allocation of
opportunity, but another thing altogether to find who gains and who loses
from that inequality. I have suggested which individuals tend to do better
(and which tend to do worse); I will penetrate these figures to find the
broader categories that can be linked to these patterns. Specifically, I will
consider the impact of gender and seniority.
1. Gender and opportunity
In an earlier article,4 7 using the narrower criterion of subsequent citation
to isolate the major decisions of the Court, I found that women judges

47. Peter McCormick, "Who Writes? Gender and Judgment Assignment on the Supreme Court of
Canada" (2014) 51:2 Osgoode Hall U 595.
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were systematically and consistently disadvantaged in the assignment of
the reasons for judgment. A complicating factor was a strong tendency
across the three most recent chief justiceships for chief justices to be
significantly over-represented in the most important cases, which created
an impression of current equality in the allocation of major cases that
masked the persisting reality of women puisne justices being consistently
under-represented. The question now is whether that tentative finding can
survive revisiting with the more robust measure and inclusive measure of
legal complexity that I have proposed in this paper. The answer, as shown
in Table 9, is a slightly qualified "Yes".
Charter

private criminal

Total

constitutional

public

8.2

3.7

11.8

14.4

11.3

49.4

Women judges incl CJ

12.9

3.2

6.6

10.6

13.9

47.1

Womenjudges excl CJ

10.5

2.1

5.8

8.8

15.1

42.3

All Judges

10.0

3.5

9.7

12.9

12.3

48.5

Menjudges

Table 9: Average per year complexity scores, by gender and type of law

Overall, women judges (including the Chief Justice) score slightly lower
than men judges on complexity; their overall totals are about 5% lower,
with the exception of criminal cases and especially Chartercases. Remove
the Chief Justice from the equation, however, and their advantage on
Charter cases largely vanishes, while overall they score 15% lower than
their counterparts. The difference is not overwhelming, but it is persistent
and pervasive-this is the same pattern suggested by the analysis ranking
cases on citation count alone.
2. Relative seniority
On the standard descriptions of how the Supreme Court decides which
judge on the panel should draft the majority judgment, seniority is one
of the most important considerations. At the conference that follows
oral argument for reserved judgments, judges have the opportunity to
volunteer for the assignment. Should more than one judge volunteer, the
senior judge writes the judgment. It is therefore reasonable to assume that
seniority carries a real advantage in the allocation of the more complex,
and therefore the more challenging and more potentially influential, cases.
Table 10 calculates the complexity score for the Court in terms of where
that member ranked in terms of relative seniority, from the most senior
to the most junior, for each of the fourteen years of the McLachlin Chief
Justiceship. The data are then broken down further by dividing it between
men and women judges.
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Women Judges

Men Judges

All Judges

Chief Justice

59.0

--

59.0

Most senior associate justice

12.3

49.7

41.7

Second most senior associate

53.0

47.2

47.6

Third most senior associate

38.8

59.5

53.6

Fourth most senior assopiate

40.0

43.0

42.1

Fifth most senior associate

39.6

43.7

42.2

Sixth most senior associate

48.1

53.3

50.7

Seventh most senior associate

47.3

56.4

50.6

Most junior associate

29.7

37.0

35.4

Seniority:

Table 10: Average per-year complexity scores, by gender and relative
seniority

The figures do not support the notion that this aspect of seniority correlates
at all strongly with the assignment of the more legally complex judgments
of the Court. The extreme ends of the table look promising-the most
junior justice of the Court has a very low average complexity score, and
the Chief Justice (by definition the most senior) has a very high score-but
,the positions in between do not line up in any neat way. For men judges
and overall, the best positions are fourth and eighth most senior; for
women, it is third most senior. Certainly there is nothing approaching the
step-wise gradual increase that the seniority rule for judgment assignment
would have us anticipate. Despite the fact that the formal descriptions
of judgment assignment seemed to direct us to relative seniority as an
important tie-breaker in volunteering for the desirable cases, there is no
clear indication that this factor matters for any members of the Court
except the Chief Justice. On this indicator, the Chief Justice is indeed first,
and by a good margin.
3. Length of service

But there is an alternative way of measuring seniority on the Court. The
problem with simply counting upward from the most recently appointed
judge is that appointments are not evenly distributed over time. Four-anda-half years after his appointment to the Court, Major J. was still the most
junior member of the Court; but five years after her own appointment
in 1987, L'Heureux-Dub6 J. was third most senior. This reflects the fact
that Major J.'s appointment marked the beginning of the longest period
between appointments in the history ofthe Supreme Court (in the American
literature, this is referred to as a "natural court"), while L'Heureux-Dub6
J.'s marked the beginning of a flurry of retirements and new appointments
that was without parallel.
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The alternative approach is to divide the judicial career into a number
of periods based on length of service; although the number of such divisions
and the length of each one is necessarily arbitrary, the underlying point is
worth exploring. My own suggestion would be to treat the first three years
of Supreme Court service as a transition period, and to characterize judges
in their second three years of service as junior judges, those in their third
three years of service as established judges, and those in or beyond their
tenth year of service as senior judges.
This information is displayed in Table 11, which links each year's
complexity score for each judge not on the basis of which individual is
involved, or on the basis of gender, but rather on the basis of how long
that particular judge had been on the Court. This means, for example, that
any specific judge started their service as a transition judge for three years,
then a junior judge for three years, then an established judge, and so on.
The number in brackets indicates the total number of "judge years" that
fell within each of the categories; the number that precedes the bracket is
the average complexity score for those years.
Men

All Judges

Length of service

Women

Senior Judges (inc. CJ)

49.9 (18)

53.4 (39)

52.6 (57)

22.5 (4)

53.4 (39)

50.6 (43)

Established Judges

40.7 (10)

44,7 (13)

43.0 (23)

Junior Judges

44.8 (14)

42.9 (15)

43.8 (29)

Transition Judges

42.0 (14)

39.8 (15)

40.8 (29)

Senior Judges (excl. CJ)

Table 11: Average per-year complexity score, by gender and absolute
seniority

Looking at the final column first: the absolute seniority measured by years
of service is much closer to generating the predicted step-wise increase as
one moves up through the categories-transition justices average lower
complexity scores than junior judges, and senior judges have higher
average complexity scores than established judges. The clear suggestion
is that judges "earn their way" through their years of service to judgment
assignments that include the more complex and more important cases,
and that it takes about a decade for the full effects of this to accrue. The
gap between senior (ten years plus) and established (seven to nine years)
judges is dramatic, all the more so because the large number of judges and
judge-years that are included mean that it cannot be thought of as driven
by some dramatically atypical subset. The pattern is equally strong if the
Chief Justice is included or excluded.
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But something very interesting happens when the length-of-service
table is divided on the basis of gender. Since men account for almost
double the total number of judge-years as women (excluding the Chief
Justice) it is unsurprising that their numbers closely track the overall
pattein, with a steady and strong step-wise increase. But the pattern for
women is rather different. For women, the career track starts strong:
women transition judges and women junior judges display slightly higher
complexity scores than their male counterparts. This tails off slightly for
the established judge category, where both the number of years and the
average complexity score per year trail their male colleagues, but overall
there is still not much to choose between the two columns. The striking
difference occurs at the top of the table, where the complexity score for
women judges drops precipitously for the senior judge category in a
double sense: first, the average score is sharply down; and second, the
total number ofjudge-years included is very low.
Both these dimensions of difference have the same explanation-very
few women serve long enough for their service to rise into my senior
judge category: three years for L'Heureux-Dub6 J. at the start of the Chief
Justiceship, one concluding year for Deschamps J. at the end of it-and,
for women judges other than the Chief Justice, that is it. Arbour J. left
early-after less than five years on the Court-for the U.N., Deschamps J.
left after ten years (precisely), Charron J. left after seven years, and Abella
J. at time of writing has not completed ten years of service. The overall
effect is striking, because the number of men judges whose service lasted
into the double digits is so much longer: Gonthier, Cory, lacobucci, Major,
Bastarache, Binnie, Fish and LeBel JJ.
There are, of course, two ways to read the table. The polite suggestion
would be that the lower complexity score for women judges is to some
extent the product of the fact that (McLachlin C.J. aside) women judges
do not continue to serve into the period when length of service begins
to generate the larger numbers of high-complexity cases-the "39 to 4"
ratio in the second-from-the-top row makes this point very starkly. The
implication is that if only the women justices had kept serving for a few
years longer the gender table that led off this section would look quite
different. The less happy suggestion would be that the dismally low
number for women senior judges other than the Chief Justice suggests
that even when women judges do serve into their second decade on the
Court, the benefits of seniority do not flow to them the same way that they
do to men, and the fact that so few achieve this level of seniority may
hint at some discouraging factor that persuades them to leave the Court
early. Either way, these findings go some way to refine the impressions
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of my earlier paper-the complexity disadvantage of women judges is
generated entirely at the higher seniority levels of the Court, and both
men and women judges of lower seniority are accorded highly comparable
opportunity shares (although, to be sure, both score lower than their
senior-and, as it happens, male-counterparts).
Conclusion
I have raised the question of whether the assignment of the writing of
reasons for judgment among the various members of the McLachlin Court
has been equal, or whether it has been tilted in some important way toward
the "first among equals" that is the chief justice. I have suggested that a
simple count ofjudgments delivered would not be the best measure, even
after from-the-bench judgments are eliminated to reduce consideration to
reserved judgments, because some cases are clearly much more important
than others.
I proposed a "legal complexity score" for each reserved judgment,
drawing on ten different objective variables from the provenance and
the handling of each case, that would allocate cases to a continuum of
legal importance. And I tested this score by looking at the distribution of
scores, at the average complexity for each of several types of law, and at
the "top ten" highest scoring cases. I suggested that adding the scores for
all the reasons for judgment by an individual judge (and evenly dividing
the scores for co-authored reasons between the judges involved) would be
a reasonable way of assessing the allocation of opportunity between the
judges, on the assumption that dealing with legally complex cases is an
important way that individual judges contribute to the Court's impact on
the law. I used these scores to rank the eighteen judges who have served
on the McLachlin Court.
I used these shares of legal complexity scores between judges to
measure the extent to which the allocation of cases in each year approaches
an equal division of opportunity, and I suggested a common sense
translation of this degree of inequality (three each of Biinie, Rothstein and
Fish JJ.) to make the point. I demonstrated that this degree of inequality
has been consistent from one year to the next, neither increasing nor
decreasing significantly and therefore constituting a persisting dimension
of the Court's performance.
I then divided the Court's case load into five subsets, and evaluated
each separately in terms of the allocation of opportunity among judges,
and used this information to identify the judges who have tended to enjoy
the highest profile in each of these categories, noting that these sets of
judges are quite different for different areas of law. I demonstrated that the
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inequality in the allocation of opportunity is at is greatest for constitutional
law; and I suggested that these inequality curves suggest a significant
degree of defacto specialization.. Finally, I used the complexity scores to
examine some of the possible correlates of inequality, specifically gender
and seniority. It was shown that relative seniority (first through ninth) was
not a good explanatory variable, but that both gender and length of service
had a strong effect, combining in such a way as to suggest that a major
reason for the apparent under-representation of the women puisne judges
in the delivery of major reasons is the fact that so few of them serve into
their second decade on the Court.
Let us turn this back against my initial questions. To what extent is
the Chief Justice "first" on the Court? In general, McLachlin C.J. is best
thought of as consistently within the ranks of a dominant top third of the
Court, the relative preponderance of her influence accumulating over time
as senior judges leave and newer judges achieve comparable seniority. For
much of the decade, the relevant triumvirate comprised McLachlin C.J.
and Lebel and Binnie JJ., although lacobucci J. was definitely a factor in
the early years of the Chief Justiceship. On a closer look, the triumvirates
are slightly different from one subset of law to another-Charron and
Fish JJ., for example, figured very prominently in criminal law, much less
so in other areas of law; for private law, one would point to Rothstein
and Deschamps JJ.-reinforcing the impression of a de facto degree of
specialization mentioned above.
The major exception to this was Charterlaw, where the Chief Justice
was very much the pre-eminent contributor, especially after the departure
from the Court of Arbour and lacobucci JJ. This suggests an important
nuance to the conclusion suggested in the previous paragraph: overall, the
Chief Justice is a team player, albeit among the leading members of that
team, except for the fact that she can enjoy a much greater pre-eminence
in some focused subset of law if she chooses.
The second question was: how equal are the judges, in terms of the
assignment of the cases that matter; the answer I have suggested is, not
very. The importance of the length-of-service factor suggests something
of an extended probationary period as judges earn their way up the
assignment ladder; since some judges serve shorter terms than others,
this can very much limit their capacity to work toward a larger-or more
equal-share of the complex decisions. But it is still the case that some
judges serve for a considerable period without getting very much to show
for it; L'Heureux-Dub6 J.>s senior status did not give her the opportunities
that such seniority might have been expected to attract; and Fish and
Deschamps JJ. accumulated complexity scores at a considerably slower

Judgment and Opportunity: Decision Assignment
on the McLachlin Court

309

rate than average. To be sure, this is mildly offset by a certain amount of
defacto specialization-Fish J. in criminal law, Deschamps J. in private
law-such that not being part of the dominant trio overall does not preclude
being part of a comparably dominant trio within some subset, but this is
still enough to support the overall conclusion that there is a consistent and
persisting degree of inequality within the allocation of opportunities on
the Court.
Let me conclude with a disclaimer, to avoid a possible misunderstanding:
I do not deny for a moment that it may well be the case that every single
assignment of majority reasons was reasonable, and perhaps even optimal
in a purely objective sense when considered on its own. I accept that a fully
appropriate person was selected for that particular case for solid legal and
professional reasons. This in no way undermines my suggestion that the
overall allocation ofjudicial opportunities to resolve legal complexity has
not been equal, and to that extent has not been "fair" to certain members
of the Court. To lapse into metaphor: it may well be that every brick in the
wall is a perfectly good and solid brick-but it is still worthwhile looking
at the shape and the patterns in the wall that results from any particular
selection and organization of those bricks, and that is what this paper has
tried to do.
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